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Introduction
The knowledge used in many expert systems can often be expressed in the form of con ditional probabilities, typically the conditional probability of making a particular observation when a given state holds. The Dempster Shaler paradigm provides a framework for deal ing with nonstatistical information, representing ignorance and combining evidence coming from multiple, independent knowledge sources. We propose an approach to the representation of sta tistical information within this framework, in or der to combine it with information from other sources.
While Shafer [ 1] shows how this goal can be achieved for discrete probability distribu tions, probability distributions of interest are often continuous. Using Strat's technique [2j,
we can derive mass functions from individual probability-density functions. To combine evi dence we can use Demspter's rule; however, in this context, Dempster's rule is computationally expensive [3J and yields very complex mass func tions without a simple intuitive interpretation. We therefore propose a rule for evidence combi nation that yields simpler results and show that this rule is both statistically sound and related to Dempster's rule.
We begin by explaining how possibility and mass functions can be derived from a probability-density function. We then prove that the evidence can be pooled simply in a way that is statistically sound and amounts to an approxi mation of Dempster's rule. Finally we introduce an example showing how this result can be gen eralized to combine evidence that is statistical in nature with evidence that is not.
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Mass Function From Proba bility Density Functions
In this section, we show how the basic method for statistical inference described by Shafer [1] can be used to handle probability-density functions.
Suppose that an expert has stated his knowl edge about a system in the form of the condi tional probability of making an observation I when the system is in state 9, for all I and 0. Let F be the set of possible observations and e the set of possible states. Suppose that we now perform an experiment and observe I. Our goal is to ass ess our beliefs about the possible states of the system.
If the prior probabilities of the states are avail able, Bayes' rule allows us to achieve this goal very simply. However, if they are not, beliefs can be assessed in the following way:
We shall assume that the evidence favors the states 9 E 9 that maximize the probability of observing the actual outcome of the experience, which amounts to a maximum-likelihood esti mate. We therefore define a possibility function, poss that plays the same role as the possibility function in Zadeh's theory [5] and is such that
If our evidence is unbiased and is free of sys tematic errors, there is no reason to disbelieve the results of the experiment. At least one state must be completely possible: we normalize poss so that maxposs(9) = 1 .
'
Such evidence can be represented by a consonant mass function mass and associated plausibility function pl such that voee, pl({9 } )=poss(9) .
In this work, we restrict ourselves to the case in which the evidence bears upon scalar quanti ties and points in a single direction, but with some uncertainty. 9 can then be considered as an interval in the set of real numbers, and we shall assume that the possibility functions are unimodal, strictly monotonically decreasing about their maximum, differentiable, and have zero value on the boundary of e.
As shown by Strat [2] , under the above as sumption such a consonant mass function ex ists and is unique. Because poss is unimodal For these continuous possibility and mass func tions to be useful, we need to be able to combine the evidence from several knowledge sources.
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Figure 1: Two Possibility Functions
We first define the following notation that will be used in the rest of this paper: Suppose that we perform two independent measurements It and 12. From them, we can derive two possibility functions poss1 and poss2, shown in Figure 1, with maxima z1 and z2 and two corresponding mass functions m1 and m2 over e = [A, B].
A Simple Rule
The possibility functions poss1(8) and poss2(8) are proportional to the conditional probabilities Pt (f t !O) and P2(f2!0). If the two measurements are independent, then Therefore a simple and statistically sound way to combine the evidence is to multiply the posAnother way to combine evidence is to use Dempster's rule. But when we combine our con tinuous mass functions, which have an infinite set of focal elements, a severe problem arises from the fact that the mass function resulting from the combination will be extremely complex and will not possess any simple intuitive mean ing. In particular, it will be highly nonconso nant. Let mpou be the mass function we derive from the product of the possibility functions by as suming consonance, and let mDemp.ter be the mass function that we obtain by "dempsteriz ing" ml and m2. Let plpou and plDemplter be the corresponding plausibility functions.
In general, massDem p 1ter will be nonconsonant and different from masspou. But the two mass functions assign proportional masses to single tons:
where k is Dempster's contradiction factor and norm= mazzee(poss t {z)poss2{z)).
Let a = 1 -k and zo be the point at which poss1 (x)poss2(x) reaches its maximum. Since 'rfx E 9, plDemp•ter ({z}) � 1,
Therefore a is always greater than norm and This observation is the key to understanding the relationship between our multiplicative com bination rule and Dempster's rule. Plausibili ties can be viewed as upper bounds on proba bilities; therefore, plpo .. is less informative than plDemp•ter· But, because these bounds are con sistently bigger, no inconsistency with respect to Dempster's rule has been introduced. This is in tuitively appealing because, in order to derive mpou, we have assumed consonance. We have "cancelled out" the nonconsonance of fflDemp•ter that resulted from the conflict between m1 and m2, thereby losing some information. In par ticular, if the two possibility fuctions have the same maximum, there is no conflict at all be tween them and it can be shown that the two combination rules yield exactly the same result.
We can thus combine the evidence by simply multiplying the possibility functions pointwise. their expression in terms of poss as in Eq. 1, the sum becomes an integral and we find the formula a= where poss'(x) is the derivative of poss with re spect to its argument.
The agreement between two knowledge sources can therefore be computed directly from the possibility functions without computing the mass functions.
In summary, by using our simple multiplica tive combination rule, we do not record the con flict between the two knowledge sources and therefore lose some information. But, because we can still evaluate Dempster's contradiction factor without computing the actual mass func tions, we are able to ascertain how good the ev idence is. We lose some information about the conflict be tween the two knowledge sources, but we shall show in the following subsection that the mag nitude of that conflict can be. estimated easily in 4 Example this context.
Agreement Between Two Knowledge Sources
In the Dempster-Shafer framework, the conflict between two knowledge sources is represented by Dempster's contradiction factor k. For discrete mass functions m1 and m2, with corresponding plausibility functions pl1 and pl2, k is defined by:
Therefore, if we call a = 1 -k the agreement between the two mass distributions, we can show that
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We now replace the discrete mass functions with the continuous ones defined above. If we assume that :z:1 � :z:2, and replace m and pl with So far we have seen that we can derive continuous possibility and mass functions from probability density functions and combine them in a statis tically consistent manner. In the following ex ample, we show how we can extend the scope of these ideas to combine statistical information with nonstatistical information that has an obvi ous representation in the Demspster-Shafer for malism.
Let us suppose that we are in court trying to determine whether a car was speeding or not. We have two pieces of evidence:
1. A police officer has clocked the car with his radar, the characteristics of which are known. The technique described above can be used to represent this information by a possibility function possr peaking at 11,. shown in Figure 2 (a) .
2.
A witness has testified that he was following the car and that, according to his speedome ter, its speed remained betwen 111 and 112. Suppose we can assess the validity of such testimony and that there is a probability ster's rule; we therefore combine the evidence by computing and normalizing the product of the possibility functions, as shown in Figure 3 . Al though possw is no longer continuous, the agree ment a can still be computed simply, yielding
, the two reports agree, a = 1 and there is no evidence against the maximum likelihood estimate v,.. If t12 < v,., the two reports star-t conflicting and the smaller v2 is, the greater the conflict. The maximum-likelihood estimate is either v2 or v,., depending on which report is more reliable; it can be shown that 1 -no;m represents the support, in the Dempster-Shafer sense, of the proposition "the speed is different from the maximum-likelihood estimate" and can be used as a measure of the validity of this estimate.
By multiplying the two possibility func tions, we are able to recover useful informa tion for decision-making. We avoid computing and "dempsterizing" the actual mass functions, which could be computationally expensive. Fur thermore, the result is a new possibility function that can again be combined in the same fashion with additional evidence.
we have derived mass functions from possi bility functions, conversely, in this case we can define a possibility function possw as the contour function of our simple support S function, as shown in Figure 2 (b).
Conclusion
We have shown that in the case of continu Multiplying the possibility functions pointwise ous scalar quantities, we can use the Dempster can be viewed as an approximation of Demp-Shafer approach to derive possibility functions and beliefs from probability distributions. The evidence can then be pooled very easily by mul tiplying the possibility functions pointwise. The approach is a consistent approximation of Demp ster's rule, and permits one to estimate simply the conflict between knowledge sources. In fu ture work, we shall generalize this approach to multivariate distributions. Because beliefs are expressed in the framework of evidential reason ing, they can be combined with those generated by any other kind of knowledge source; this is a very desirable feature for automated decision making.
